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1 Introduction
This paper revisits specically for the securities market two major issues in in-
nite horizon equilibrium theory: the occurrence of Ponzi schemes and of price
bubbles. We do this by capturing the basic fact that in order to short sell a
security, one has to borrow it. In this context, shorting and issuing are perfectly
distinguished. This allows us to focus on the pure trading aspects of securities.
Rather than assuming solvency constraints or debt limits, we see how the way
securities are traded already constrains the asymptotic values of security po-
sitions. Then, we address the problematic introduced by Santos and Woodford
(1997), "the conditions under which asset prices in an inter-temporal competitive
equilibrium are equal to" the expected discounted value of futures cash ows.
It is our view that repo market theory is a core part of security markets
theory, as borrowing and lending of securities cannot be ignored. Models have to
keep track of both security positions and (title) possession out of a nite pool.
Formally, a repo trade consists in a security sale under the agreement of a future
repurchase at a predetermined date and price. It is a collateralized loan, where
the security that serves as a collateral is kept by the creditor (the borrower of
the security), who tends to use it, lending on or shorting, before the delivery is
due.
A bit out of necessity (so bubbles are not merely killed by the nite horizon!),
we extend the literature on nancial equilibrium that has incorporated the repo
market in a general equilibrium model with nite horizon (see Du¢ e (1996)
and Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2011a)). Thus, we add a market for funding
securities in an innite horizon framework, absent in previous papers in the eld
(see Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Hernández and Santos (1996),
Magill and Quinzii (1994, 1996) and Santos and Woodford (1997)).
Also, we have seen how Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2011a) introduces pos-
session (or specialness) value as part of the normal value of a security. Thus, we
include possession value into the fundamental value of a security. And we will
say that there is a bubble in a given security if its value exceeds the sum of the
expected discounted value of its cash ows plus its possession value.
When repo markets were ignored, the equilibrium literature had assumed two
sorts of portfolio constraints, with quite di¤erent purposes. One, (a) a plain
bounded short sales constraint, for equilibrium in nite horizon economies, in
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order to overcome Harts (1975) problem. Another, (b) constraints on the value
of debt (bounding it uniformly or relating it to future wealth) that managed
to avoid Ponzi schemes, when uniform impatience was assumed. An exception
was the model by Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) with collateralized
promises, such as mortgages, where the same form of secured borrowing served
both purposes1 Obviously, the plain no-short-sales restriction also served both
purposes, without any need for uniform impatience. However, it was hard to see
what was the institutional framework behind constraints (a) or (b).
Knowing one needs to borrow a security in order to short it, there is a nat-
ural possession constraint, the non-negativity of title collected for each security,
(in the box). Such non-negativity contraint is quite di¤erent from the above
instrumental constraints.
In such a context, the two forms of limited re-hypothecation introduced in
nite horizon (in Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2011a)) readily extend to open
ended horizon, where they actually also guarantee equilibrium even with innite
lived agents and without uniform impatience requirements. These are two in-
stitutional arrangements that end up restricting the way in which a borrowed
security will be lent again several times (possibly by being shorted and then lent
by the buyer2). One of these two forms is the provision that the security bor-
rowed through repo cannot be fully shorted or lent, more precisely, the haircut
portion of the pledged security, paid for with client money, cannot be re-used3.
We call this the direct limited re-hypothecation case. The other form is based on
1The rst purpose was met as the nite supply of asset to pledge as collateral in Asset
Backed Securities (the housing stock for Mortgages) limits possible issuance. Interestingly, in
the sub-prime crisis, when in 2007 Wall-street ran out of assets to pledge (sub-prime loan)
to satiate the investor appetite, such a bound of the underlying stock of assets was stepped
aside. The issuance went on articially using the derivative markets through the synthetic
CDOs market - see a narrative account of this in Michael Lewiss "The Big Short."). But
when pledged assets are replaced by a combination of cash and CDS, the quantity of available
asset is no upper bound on issuance. We think such arrangements should be discouraged in
the future.
2Aitken and Singh (2009) addressed re-hypothecation in the narrower sense of lending a
security that one had borrowed. Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2011a) include also the re-
hypothecation that occurs when the shorted security is lent by the buyer.
3This is a more and more common practice, and for the equivalent of haircuts in the deriv-
atives market (initial margins), such initial margins are segregated when cleared on an ex-
change. Practice and regulation are more and more pushing towards such a segregation, after
the Lehman crisis.
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the current market practice of bounding the positions of dealers, who are exempt
from paying haircut and actually collect haircuts from customer. We call this
the constrained dealers case.
Limited re-hypothecation bounds the leverage that can be done in the eco-
nomy. One may think that the haircut alone is enough to bound leverage (by the
inverse of the haircut rate). This is true when leverage is done by just trading
in one security and its respective repo market. But, when we combine these
operations on more than one security, the haircut alone cannot bound leverage:
the haircut paid in one security can be compensated by the haircut collected in
another security. In this respect, our conclusion is that the institutional arrange-
ments that bound leverage will also prevent Ponzi schemes.4
The equilibrium existence result has an important implication in terms of
security pricing. A central result in the literature of asset pricing bubbles (see
Santos and Woodford (1997) and Magill and Quinzii (1996)) asserts that, if short
sales were allowed, the (previous) no-Ponzi schemes conditions (debt constraints
coupled with uniform impatience) end up ruling out also bubbles, for deators
yielding nite present value of wealth and when assets were in positive net supply.
In contrast, the two forms of limited re-hypothecation we introduced are now
compatible with incomplete market bubbles for positive net supply securities,
under time and state separable preferences.
We illustrate this result with two examples, one for each form of limited
rehypothecation. There, consumers are impatient, although not uniformly (the
discount factor is not stationary as beliefs change across di¤erent paths). This
scenario allows for bubbles in positive net supply securities with associated repo
market. The deator is given by the marginal rates of substitution and yields a
nite present value of wealth. This result adds to the examples by Santos and
Woodford (1997) and Páscoa, Petrassi and Torres-Martinez (2011) that showed
how an incomplete markets scenario without uniform impatience can generate
bubbles of securities that cannot be shorted.
In the equilibria of these examples, there are no positive shadow prices for
the box constraint and, therefore, the security price is just equal to the series of
deated future expected cash ows plus the bubble. If the box constraint had a
shadow price, the security would be on special at that node.5
4In particular, if dealers were not constrained they could do a Ponzi scheme through the
haircut collection process.
5More precisely, this is the case when the General Collateral (GC) rate would coincide with
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In general, specialness and the bubble are compatible, at any node. These
are now the two possible causes for the security price to exceed the series of
discounted expected cash ows. There is an important reason why we include
possession value in the fundamental value of the security: arbitrage should be
dened by taking the box non-gnegativity constraint into account. We also
show that, under the Kuhn-Tucker deator process, a bubble is, nevertheless,
incompatible with an asymptotic specialness (a positive di¤erence between the
repo and the general collateral rates, in the limit).
The next sections are as follows. In section 2 we present an innite horizon
model with repo markets. Section 3 studies individual optimality and provides
equilibrium existence results, under the above two cases of limited rehypoth-
ecation. Section 4 addresses the possibility of doing Ponzi schemes by means
of repo, when none of these two cases is being considered. Section 5 addresses
bubbles and Section 6 provides two examples of incomplete markets equilibrium
with bubbles in a positive net supply security. Section 7 discusses specialness in
the innite horizon setting.
2 The innite horizon model
2.1. Uncertainty
We consider a discrete time innite horizon economy. The set of dates is given
by T = f0; 1; :::g : The initial date is free of uncertainty, whereas at each of the
following dates a nite set of states of nature may occur. An information set
 = (t; st; s) is called a node of the economy, where t 2 T represents the date,
st = (s0; :::; st 1) the previous history of realizations of states of nature, and s
the state that occurs at date t. We say that  = (t0; st0 ; s0) is a successor of ,
and write    if t0  t and st0 = (st; s; :::): The set of immediate successors
of node  is denoted by +. The unique predecessor of  is denoted by  : The
unique information set at t = 0 is 0: We write  >  if    but  6= :
The set of nodes is denoted by D and it is called the event-tree. Let D() =
f 2 D :   g be the subtree with root : The set of nodes with date T in D()
is denoted by DT (): Finally, let DT () = [Tk=t()DT () be the set of successors
the interest rate on unsecured borrowing (say, the Fed funds rate). Otherwise, if the GC rate
were itself below the unsecured rate, a box shadow price might occur without the security being
on special (see Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2011b)). See also Du¢ e (1996)) on specialness.
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of  with date less or equal than T:
2.2. Innite lived agents and commodities
There is a nite set of innite lived agents I: There are L di¤erent types of com-
modities that agents use for consumption. Each agent i 2 I has an endowment
of commodities !i 2 RLD++ ; which is assumed to be bounded from below at each
node. Total endowments at node  are denoted by 
 
P
i !
i
: The consumption
set is RLD+ : Agent is utility function, given by U i : RLD+ ! R+ [ f+1g, is
assumed to be separable in time and states of nature, i.e., for any x 2 RLD++ , we
dene U i(x) P2D ui(x); where ui(:) is the Bernoulli utility function at node
. Moreover, we also impose the following standard assumptions:
(A1) (i) For any node  2 D; the function ui is twice continuously di¤er-
entiable and strictly increasing; (ii) ui(0) = 0 and
P
2D u
i
(
) < +1; (iii)
Dui(x) 2 RL++; 8x 2 RL+; (iv) 8c 2 R; the set [ui] 1(c) is closed in RL++, and
(v) at every x 2 RL++; h0  D2ui(x)  h < 0, 8h 6= 0.6
(A2) Commodity endowments are uniformly bounded away from zero: for
any i 2 I, !i o 0.
2.3. Security markets
We conceive the initial period 0 as a situation where issuance has already
happened, and issued securities have been placed. Each agent i thus has initial
endowments ei 2 RJ++ of securities, describing his holdings when trading starts.
Securities are traded at every node in the event-tree. We denote a trade
in security j at node  2 D by yij: Agent is security j position at node  is
'ij: At the initial node 0 the position is '
i
j0
= eij + y
i
j0
: For node  > 0,
the corresponding position is 'ij = '
i
j  + y
i
j (the previous position '
i
j  plus
current trade yij). A short sale at node  2 D occurs when the position gets
negative, that is, when 'ij < 0.
We model securities as real assets. The case of securities with exogenous
nominal yields could be easily accommodated. The real proceeds of security j
6Here D denotes the di¤erential operator. Items (i), (iii) and (iv) were already assumed
in Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2011a). Item (v) already appeared but in the weaker form of
di¤erential strict quasi-concavity. These items allow us to bound the intertemporal rates of
substitution from above and from below. Inada conditions would be too extreme in this model
with repo markets, where a period can be very short, possibly overnight.
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at node  > 0 are given by a non-zero vector Bj 2 RL+. Moreover, we assume
that each good has at least some security paying in that good.7 Formally, we
assume that for any  2 D, the real returns matrix B of type L  J does not
have null rows. Given spot prices at node  2 D, p 2 RL+, the nominal return
of security j is then given by pBj: The security market transactions of node
 take place at a price denoted by qj: Notice that this characterization of the
returns matrix actually is in accordance with the common view of understanding
securities as valuables - a security can be thought to represent the value of a
commodity basket.
Taking into account security proceeds, we have that the total resources of
physical commodities at node  2 D are Pi ~!i  Pi !i +Pj BjPi 'ij 
2.4. Repo markets
We introduce repo trading by using the variable z. Notation follows Bottazzi,
Luque and Páscoa (2011). An agent is said to be long in repo, denoted by z > 0;
if he borrows the security in exchange of a cash loan. On the other hand, the
agent is short in repo, denoted by z < 0, if he is the lender of the security and the
borrower of cash. Repos are traded at every node  2 D. The loan associated
with repo is jzj, where zj represents the amount of security j engaged in
the repo and j is the haircutted price of the collateralized loan signed at node
. The haircut (1   hj) 2 [0; 1]; exogenously given in this model, is imposed
to compensate the lender of funds with the risk associated with a simultaneous
default and adverse market move of the security lent.8 For the sake of simplicity
and following typical market practice, we assume that all repos on the same
security and same node  2 D share a common haircut.9 The collateralized loan
price is then j = hjqj. We assume that, for a repo contract signed at node
 , the repurchase takes place at the following date (that is, at t( ) + 1) at
repo interests rj. The repo rate (or interest rate) on a repo loan at node 
  is
rj   1  j.
Securities borrowed can be re-hypothecated, that is, lent or short sold (and
7For example, if there is a forward term contract for each good.
8For endogenous haircuts in the case of mortgages see Geanakoplos [14] and Araujo, Fajardo
and Páscoa [3]. In Fostel and Geanakoplos [13] the margins on nancial assets collateralizing
money promises are also endogenous. In a recent paper, Brunnermeier and Pedersen [7] address
the dependence of margins or haircuts on assets market liquidity.
9This can and should be relaxed when we focus more on credit of the trading entities -
something we do not go into here.
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then lent by the buyer). Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2011a) showed that, for
economies with more than one security, existence of equilibrium in a two-dates
economy requires the rehypothecation of securities to be bounded. Two scenarios
were shown to verify this: direct limited rehypothecation and constrained dealers.
These scenarios are now adapted to our innite horizon model.
I) Direct limited re-hypothecation
In this case the security borrower cannot re-hypothecate a certain percentage
of the borrowed amount of the security. To make a simple argument we assume
that haircut paid is being segregated.10 Thus, the re-hypothecation percentage
should be no more than 1 - the haircut rate, as the excess security pledged is not
lent on. That is, the fraction Hj of a security j that can be sold or lent out in
repo after being borrowed at node  must satisfy Hj  hj < 1. The haircut
posted by counterparties (and paid for with their own funds) is set aside.
Budget constraints in this innite horizon framework depart from previous
ones in the literature. Agent is budget constraints at nodes 0 and  > 0 are,
respectively,
gi0(a0 ; p; q; r)  p0(x0   !i0) + q0('0   ei + h0z0)  0 (1)
gi(a; a  ; p; q; r)  p(x !i)+q(' ' +hz) pB'  q r h z )  0
(2)
where a  (x; '; z) denotes an agents plan at node :11 This budget con-
straint says that the value of the excess of commodities demand, asset purchases
and repo long positions (z > 0) minus short positions (z < 0) must be below
the commodity returns of accumulated asset positions (' ) and the repo loan
repayments of the previous repo agreements (q r h z ).
Agent is box constraint of security j at node  is
f i;Hj (a)  'j +Hz+j   z j  0 (3)
10There is an evolution of practice in that direction, it may be accentuated by regulation,
including interpretation of existing law (as haircut is paid for with customer money). Note how
this assumption is not dissimilar to the segregation of initial margin by exchanges for vanilla
derivatives like interest rate swaps.
11For notation brevety, when two vectors a = (a1; :::; aN ) and b = (b1; :::; bN ); with the same
dimension, appear multiplied, ab; we mean the vector ab = (a1b1; :::; aNbN ): This is the case
of products hz and rh z  :
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where z+j = maxf0; zjg and z j =  minf0; zjg. So, zj = z+j   z j: Now,
f i;Hj is a concave function as f
i;H
j (a) = 'j + zj   (1 H)z+j:
II) Constrained dealers
As it currently happens, not all agents get the cash benet from collecting
a haircut when borrowing a security - in other words, giving a cash loan and
receiving a security as collateral that is worth more. Agents whose business is
intermediation (Dealers/Prime brokers) have this cash benet, but in practice
have their positions bounded in value by regulation. The mechanisms often
are among other things BIS ratios limits. Their customers (e.g., hedge funds,
mutual funds, retail securities brokers, private banks and insurance companies)
do not face such regulation on their positions, but must pay haircut when lending
securities. We refer to the former as dealers (D) and to the latter as non-dealers
(ND). As it usually occurs, we assume that non-dealers only engage in repo with
dealers.
Due to the asymmetry in the haircut treatment, we have to use di¤erent
variables for security borrowing and lending. We denote the long and short repo
positions at node  by   0 and    0, respectively. When a dealer is long in
repo (and thus the non-dealer is short) the interest rate that applies is r1; while
if the dealer is short in repo (and thus the non-dealer is long) the interest rate
that applies is r2: Notice that dealers like to take positions in these two variables,
whereas non-dealers prefer to have just one of them non-null (see Bottazzi, Luque
and Páscoa (2011a)). However, regulation prevents dealers from taking positions
in the two variables that are too big.
Dealer i 2 D budget constraints at nodes 0 and  > 0 are, respectively,
gi0(a0 ; p; q; r)  p0(x0   !i0) + q0('0   ei + h00    0)  0 (4)
gi(a; a  ; p; q; r)  p(x   !i) + q('   '  + h    ) 
  pB'    q (r1 h     r2   )  0 (5)
Non-dealer i 2 ND budget constraints at nodes 0 and  > 0 are, respec-
tively,
gi0(a0 ; p; q; r)  p0(x0   !i0) + q0('0   ei + 0   h0 0)  0 (6)
gi(a; a  ; p; q; r)  p(x   !i) + q('   '  +    h ) 
  pB'    q (r2     r1 h   )  0 (7)
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For both dealers and non-dealers, the security j box constraint of an agent i 2
D [ND at node  is
f ij(a)  'j + j    j  0 (8)
We assume that the borrowing of securities by dealers is bounded by regulation
in the following way:
(A3) The real values of dealer is long repo positions are uniformly bounded,
i.e., for each j,
qjP
l pl
j Mj (9)
As the regulator sets upper bounds on real rather than just nominal values,
this policy does not su¤er from monetary illusion. That is, the regulator takes
into account ination (or deation) when setting the bounds.
Notice that (A3) implies that the real value of dealersshort sales is also uni-
formly bounded. In fact, the box constraint together with (A3) imply qjP
l pl
'j 
 Mj. Notice that the weaker version holds: nominal values of security borrowing
and short-sales are clearly (uniformly) bounded (as (p; q) can be normalized to
be in the simplex). This implies that feasible security (and repo positions) have
(uniformly) bounded nominal values, which is what Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa
(2011a) assumed to show existence of equilibrium in a nite horizon economy of
type II.
3 Individual optimality and equilibrium
We now introduce the equilibrium concept for this economy. Let us rst denote
by ai a plan for agent i at (p; q; r): For case I (direct limited rehypothecation) an
individual plan is given by the vector ai = (xi; 'i; zi) 2 RLD+  RJD  RJD;
where xi is subject to the sign constraint xi  0. For case II (constrained dealers)
this plan is ai = (xi; 'i; i;  i) 2 RLD+  RJD  RJD+ RJD+ ; where xi  0;
i  0 and  i  0. We say that a plan ai is individually admissible for agent i
if it satises constraints (2) and (3) in case I, (5), (8) and (9) in case II with i
being a dealer, and (7) and (8) if case II with i being a non-dealer. Consumer is
problem is said to be optimal if he chooses an admissible plan ai that maximizes
his utility U i. We assume that
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Denition 1: An equilibrium for this economy consists on a vector of prices
(p; q; r) 2 RLD+  RJD+  RJD+ and individual plans (ai)i2I, such that,
(i) for each agent i 2 I, the plan ai is optimal at prices (p; q; r):
(ii) at any node  2 D; commodity, security and repo markets clear, that is,X
i2I
xi   
 = 0;
X
i2I
('i   ei) = 0;
and X
i2I
zi = 0, if case IX
i2ND

i
 =
X
i2D
 
i
 = 0 and
X
i2D

i
 =
X
i2ND
 
i
 = 0, if case II
Before characterizing the Euler and transversality conditions for this economy,
let us rst denote agent is Lagrangian at node  by12
Li(a; a  ;
i
; 
i
; p; q; r)  ui(x)  igi(a; a  ; p; q; r) + if i(a)
Let Li1 and L
i
2 denote super-gradient vectors of L
i
 with respect to present and
previous plans a and a , respectively.
Proposition 1: If ai is an optimal solution to (i) of Denition 1, then there
exist multipliers (i)2D  0 and (i)2D  0 together with super-gradients for
ui and f
i
 at a
i
 such that the following Euler conditions are satised
Li1(a
i) +
X
2+
Li2(a
i)  0 (10)
0@Li1(ai) +X
2+
Li2(a
i)
1A ai = 0 (11)
and the following transversality condition holds
lim sup
T!1
X
:t()=T
0@X
2+
Li2(a
i)ai
1A  0 (12)
12This is the Lagrangian of a convex problem and we refer the reader to Rockafellar (1970).
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Proposition 2: Let ai be an admissible plan for agent i, at prices (p; q; r).
Suppose ai satises Euler and transversality conditions (10), (11) and (12), re-
spectively, at (p; q; r). Then, ai is individually optimal if, for any plan ai satis-
fying the corresponding individuals budget and box constraints13, we have
lim sup
T!1
X
:t()=T
Li1(a
i)ai  0 (13)
Inequality (13) means that the plan a, of consumption, security and repo
trades, when weighted by current marginal benets, has a vanishing value. In
a model where naked short-sales are naively allowed, (13) reduces to the well-
known condition that the plan a should not allow the agent to be a debtor at
innity (lim infT
P
:t()=T qj'j  0). Now the current marginal benet must
take into account the cost of borrowing securities (that is, qj would be reduced
by j). See Section 4 on repo Ponzi schemes for a detailed analysis.
Santos and Woodford (1997) showed that an exogenous restriction to debt is
equivalent to restriction (13) if the strong assumption of uniform impatience is
imposed. In this paper we do not need to impose uniform impatience, as our
natural modeling of short sales for securities does not need it.
Lemma 1: The present value of wealth is nite for the Lagrange multipliers
deator process i:
The proof of Lemma 1 is established in the Appendix, as in Proposition 2 in
Páscoa, Petrassi and Torres-Martínez (2011). Now, let us show that:
Proposition 3: Let ai be an admissible plan for agent i, at prices (p; q; r),
satisfying Euler conditions (10) and (11), in cases I or II. Then, the condition
(13) holds (in both cases I or II, respectively).
We get the following existence result:
Theorem 1: Equilibrium exists, in case (I) under (A.1) and in case (II)
under (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3).
The proof, given in the Appendix, uses Propositions 2 and 3.
13Constraints (2) and (3) in case I, (5), (8) and (9) in case II with i being a dealer, and (7)
and (8) if case II with i being a non-dealer.
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4 Repo Ponzi schemes
Outside of cases I or II, Ponzi schemes can be done, envolving a new type of
innite horizon arbitrage combining security and repo positions. Suppose budget
constraints are, as in case I, described by (2) but limited rehypothecation is not
imposed, so that the security j box constraint is as follows, at each node :
'j + zj  0 (14)
To simplify, we assume the economy to be deterministic, although the ar-
gument extends to stochastic economies straighforwardly. Now, given any plan
(x; '; z) satisfying budget and box constraints ((2) and (14), respectively), for a
consumer i, we reduce the security position 't and match this by increasing the
repo position zt in the same amount at some date t, with a net gain in income
(due to the haircut) and then repeat this procedure at all following dates, but
possibly with di¤erent amounts in order to accommodate the changes in debt
and dividends. Such variation can then be scaled up arbitrarily.
To be more precise, we consider the following variation: at date t, the repo
position zt is increased by "t > 0 and the security position 't is decreased by "t:
Box constraint (14) remains satised at date t, but this joint operation results in a
gain at date t given by qt(1 ht)"t that can be spent on extra consumption. At the
following date, t+ 1, the consumer can accommodate the variation in dividends
and debt (net of the settlement of the repo variation) by nding "t+1 > 0; so
that zt+1 is increased by "t+1, 't is decreased by "t > 0 and 't+1 is decreased by
"t+1; while preserving the budget constraint (2) at date t+1. That is, "t+1 must
satisfy
qt+1(1  ht+1)"t+1   (qt+1 + pt+1Bt+1)"t + qthtrt"t  0
Hence, we must have
"t+1  (qt+1 + pt+1Bt+1   qthtrt)"t
qt+1(1  ht+1)
This condition can always be satised by any "t+1 > 0 when the numerator
on the right hand side is negative and by "t+1 > 0 large enough if the numerator
is positive, which would be the case when Euler equations on security and repo
positions hold14. We repeat the procedure at the following dates and obtain a
14These conditions hold in the form of the following equations (as the variables are not sign
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vector of increments ("t; "t+1; :::) that determines an increase in the utility of
consumer i: By multiplying this vector by an arbitrarily large scalar  > 0 we
get unbounded utility gains.
Analogous Ponzi scheme could not be done in case I or II. In case I, if zt > 0,
for box constraint (3) to hold, when zt increases by "t, 't cannot decrease more
than Ht"t: However, as Ht  ht; the combination of these variations involves a
cost to the consumer, at least equal to the extra loan given in repo (qtht"t) minus
the decrease in the security position (qtHt"t): If zt < 0, although it would possible
to decrease both z t and 't by "t, with a resulting income gain (qt(1   ht)"t),
such arbitrage could not be scaled up by an arbitrarily high  > 0; as zt would
become positive.
In case II, the box constraint (8) allows for an increment "t in t accompanied
by a reduction "t in 't: If the consumer is a non-dealer, there would be no
change in income at date t (as no haircut is being collected by him, see (7)).
However, this joint operation yields a non-positive payo¤ at the next date, given
by qtrt"t  (qt+1+pt+1Bt+1)"t. In fact, this di¤erence is non-positive, as we know
that Euler conditions hold (since an optimum was shown to exist, by Proposition
3), which tell us that qt+1 + pt+1Bt+1 =
it
it+1
qt   
i
t
it+1
and qtrt  
i
t
it+1
qt   
i
t
it+1
(the inequality form is due to the sign constraint on security borrowing). This
cost cannot be compensated by repeating the operation at t+ 1; since again an
increment in t+1 accompanied by a symmetric reduction in 't+1 would not bring
an income gain (by the same argument using (7)).
If the consumer were a dealer instead, the above joint modication of t and 't
would result in an income gain (1 ht)qt"t at date t (according to (5)). However,
dealers have bounded positions and, therefore, such arbitrage could not be scaled
up arbitrarily. This shows the importance of regulations around balance-sheet
limitation and haircut segregation for dealers.
constrained) qt+1 + pt+1Bt+1 =
it
it+1
qt   
i
t
it+1
and qthtrt =
it
it+1
qtht   
i
t
it+1
:
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5 Bubbles in complete markets
Using the Euler conditions on security positions, recursively, we obtain the fol-
lowing pricing formula for security j at node 
qj =
fundamental security valuez }| {X
>
i
i
pBj| {z }
discounted dividends
+
X

ij
i| {z }
specialness
+
1
i
lim
T
X
:t()=T
iq| {z }
bubble
(15)
where the sum of the two series constitutes the fundamental value and the
last term is the bubble.
Proposition 4: Bubbles cannot occur under complete markets.
Observe that the absence of bubbles refers to the unique deator, given by
common marginal rates of intertemporal substitution, for which the present value
of wealth is nite (see Lemma 1).
Proof of Proposition 4: To see this, recall that the transversality condition
is
lim sup
T
X
:t()=T
  Li1(ai)  ai  0 (16)
In case I we write (16) as
lim sup
T
X
:t()=T
( Dui + ip)xi+
+ (iq   i)'i + (iqh   i)zi  0
Now, i('
i
 + z
i
) = 0 implies
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lim sup
T
X
:t()=T
i(q'
i
 + qhz
i
) 
 0 + lim sup
T
X
:t()=T
i(Dui   ip)xi  0
If i = ;8i; then
lim sup
T
X
:t()=T
q(
X
i
'i + h
X
i
zi) 

X
i
lim sup
T
X
:t()=T
q('
i
 + hz
i
)  0
15Recall that lim sup(A B)  lim sup(A)  lim sup(B):
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Hence, we have lim supT
P
:t()=T qe  0; implying that lim supT
P
:t()=T q 
0. At any node , 0  limT
P
:t()=T q  q <1 and
lim
T
X
:t()=T
q  lim sup
T
X
:t()=T
q
so limT
P
:t()=T q = 0.
Now we show that bubbles cannot occur either in case II under complete
markets. In fact, in this case (16) implies that
lim sup
T
X
:t()=T
q(
X
i
'i + h(
X
d
d  
X
nd
 nd )+
+ (
X
nd
nd  
X
d
 d))  0
Market clearing then implies lim supT
P
:t()=T qe  0 and, therefore, for any
node , limT
P
:t()=T q = 0: 
However, under incomplete markets the term limT
P
:t()=T q may be
positive, as shown in the examples below.
6 Bubbles in incomplete markets: Examples
We give now two examples where bubbles occur, under a deator yielding -
nite present value of wealth, for a positive net supply asset that is shorted in
equilibrium. Preferences and endowments do not satisfy uniform impatience
conditions, but these are not required for existence of equilibrium in cases I or
II. Recall that in earlier models, equilibrium existed when short sales were either
ruled out or were treated as naked short sales (although subject to constraints
on the value of borrowing), but uniform impatience had to be assumed in the
latter.
Example 1: This is an example of a security and repo equilibrium for an
economy with two innite lived agents, A and B, trading one commodity and
one security in sequential incomplete markets. Ponzi schemes are avoided by
limited rehypothecation (case I, with h = H) and the security has a price bub-
ble. Preferences and endowments are adapted from an example of a monetary
equilibrium in Páscoa, Petrassi and Torres-Martínez (2011), but at money (with
a no-short-sales constraint) is now replaced by a security paying real dividends.
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Portfolios must satisfy the box constraint (3): security purchases can be funded
and short sales can be done using what has been borrowed of the security.
The innite tree D has two branches, up (stu  (t; st; u)) or down (std 
(t; st; d)), at each node . We denote by stu the node attained after the history
of node realizations st by going up (and similarly for std). Preferences are
given by U i(x) =
P
2D 
t()ix; for i = A;B; where  2 (0; 1) is the discount
factor and ist 2 (0; 1) is the probability belief at node st satisfying 
i
0
= 1;
ist
= istu
+ istd
, Au = (1=2
t()+1)Ast
and Bstu = (1   (1=2
t()+1))Bst
: We
denote by stud the node attained after the history of node realizations st by
going up and then down (and similarly for other pairs of branches).
Commodity endowments have a trend component equal to 1 for both agents.
Endowment shocks benet agent A when down is followed by up, while agent
B gets also a positive shock but when up is followed by down and at 0d. More
precisely, agent As endowment is !A = 1 + Pt() if  = du for some  2 D
and equals 1 otherwise. Agent Bs endowment is !B = 1 + Pt() if  = 0d or
 = ud for some  2 D and equals 1 otherwise. The positive shocks Pt() will
be specied below.
The security pays Bt units of the commodity at every node occurring at date
t:16 Agent A is endowed with 1 unit of the security at 0; while agent B is not
endowed.
Equilibrium prices: Let us take the security to be the numeraire and denote
the commodity price by p. We will nd equilibrium prices that depend only on
the date and denote these by pt(). Euler conditions on consumption are satised
when the Lagrange budget multiplier i is given by 
i
 = 
i

t()=p: Making
box shadow prices equal to zero, the Euler condition on security positions holds
if i = 
t()+1i(Bt()+1 + 1=pt()+1), that is, if (1=pt()+1)   (1=)(1=pt()) =
 Bt()+1: The Euler condition on repo positions holds if the repo rate paid at
nodes of date t coincides with ptBt :
We want endowment shocks to have a value 1, in units of account. Hence,
Pt() = 1=pt() and solves the following di¤erence equation:
Pt()+1   (1=)Pt() =  Bt()+1
16Notice that there is no possible confusion between the agent B and the dividends Bt, as
the latter are always indexed by the time subscript, while the former not.
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Assuming Bt = kt with k 2 (0; 1) and positing P0 = 1 the solution becomes
Pt = 
 t +
k
k   (1=)(
 t   kt) (6.1)
Equilibrium positions: Budget and box constraints at node  are, respectively,
p(x
i
   !i) + yi + hzi  pBt()'i  + (1 + pBt())hzi  (6.2)
'i  + y
i
 + z
i
  0 (6.3)
where  = h if z
i
 > 0 and 1 otherwise. At the initial node 0 we have
(xA0 ; '
A
0
; zA0) = (!
A
0
; 1; 0) and (xB0 ; '
B
0
; zB0) = (!
B
0
; 0; 0): At node 0d, agent
B uses his endowment shock to purchase the security with funding, that is,
yB0d + hz
B
0d
= 1, which implies yB0d =  zB0d = a; where a  1=(1   h): At this
node agent A consumes the dividends from the aggregate endowment of the se-
curity (and also at node 0u). Hence, x
B
0d
= !B0d   P1, xA0d = !A0d + P1 + B1,
'A0d = 1   a < 0 and zA0d = a > 1: At node 0u, there are no security or repo
trades.
At node 0du; agent B consumes the dividends from the aggregate endowment
of the security (and also at node 0dd). That is, x
A
0du
= !A0du   P2 and xB0du =
!B0du + P2 + B2: By (6.2), y
B
0du
+ hzB0du + ha =  1: Agent Bs security trade
yB0du = 1   2a implies a position 'B0du = 1   a: Then, (6.3) holds for zB0dU = a.
By market clearing, we get 'A0du = a and z
A
0du
=  a: At node 0dd; there are
no security trades and positions are ('A0dd ; z
A
0dd
) = (1  a; a) and ('B0dd ; zB0dd) =
(a; a):
At node 0duu agent A consumes the dividends from the aggregate endowment
of the security (and also at node 0dud). Security trades are zero and positions
become ('A0duu ; z
A
0duu
) = (a; a) and ('B0duu ; zB0duu) = (1   a; a): At node 0dud;
security trades are yA0dud = 1 2a and yB0dud = 2a 1; so ('A0dud ; zA0dud) = (1 a; a)
and ('B0dud ; z
B
0dud
) = (a; a):We have determined positions at all types of nodes.
See graphs 1 and 2 below.
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(1,0,1)
(1,0,1)
(1-a, a,0)
(1-a,a,0)
(a,-a,1)
(1-a,a,0)
(a, -a,1)
+
Graph 1: Agent As positions
('A; zA; 'A + hzA):
(0,0,0)
(0,0,0)
(a, -a,1)
(a,-a,1)
(1-a,a,0)
(a,-a,1)
(1-a, a,0)
+
+
+
Graph 2: Agent Bs positions
('B; zB; 'B + hzB):
To guarantee that the above plans and prices constitute an equilibrium, it
just remains to check that the transversality condition (3.3) holds. Using (3.2),
this condition can be written as
lim sup
T
X
:t()=T
  Li1(ai)  ai  0 (6.4)
As the condition (3.1) for consumption holds with equality, (6.4) becomes
lim sup
T
X
:t()=T
i
 
'i + hz
i

  0 (6.5)
Now, notice that 'i + hz
i
 coincides with the money position in the example of
Páscoa, Petrassi and Torres-Martínez (2011), whereas by (6.1), we have
i = 
i


1 +
k
k   (1=)(1  (k)
t())

(6.6)
where i is the budget multiplier in that example (that is, the multiplier that
would make the Euler equation in consumption hold if pt were 
t), for which
limT
P
:t()=T 
i

 
'i + hz
i


= 0. If k < 1 then i < 
i
 and, therefore, (6.5)
holds.
Bubble: In this equilibrium the security has a price bubble. In fact, at each
node  the security price 1 is equal to the fundamental value plus the bubble given
by (1=i) limT
P
:t()=T 
i
. To evaluate this limit we use (6.6), noticing that
limT (1 +
k
k (1=)(1  (k)t())) > 0 for 2k < 1= and that limT
P
:t()=T 
i
 =
i > 0 (since at money had price 1 and zero fundamental value in the example of
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Páscoa, Petrassi and Torres-Martínez (2011)). Notice that the Lagrange deator
process (i) for which the bubble occurs yields a nite present value of wealth
(as already mentioned in Section 3). |
Example 2: Let us now consider a di¤erent scenario, where agent A is a
non-dealer and agent B is a dealer. This corresponds to case II of the analysis
above. In order to characterize equilibrium in this framework, we need to do
the following modications with respect to Example 1 above. Now the Euler
condition on repo positions holds if both repo rates (r1   1 and r2   1) paid
at nodes of date t() coincides with pt()Bt() : Then, agents A and Bbudget
constraint are, respectively,
p(x
A
   !A ) + yA + A   h A  pBt()'A  + (1 + pBt())(A    h A ) (6.7)
p(x
B
   !B ) + yB + hB    B  pBt()'B  + (1 + pBt())(hB     B ) (6.8)
Agents A and Bbox constraints are, respectively,
'A + 
A
    A  0 (6.9)
'B + 
B
    B  0 (6.10)
The equilibrium positions are now the following. At the initial node 0
there are no securities nor repo trades, so (xA0 ; '
A
0
; A0 ;  
A
0
) = (!A0 ; 1; 0; 0) and
(xB0 ; '
B
0
; B0 ;  
B
0
) = (!B0 ; 0; 0; 0): At node 0d, agent B has a positive shock
and uses this extra endowment to lend cash through repo, so  B0d > 0 and
B0d = 0: Agent Bs budget and box constraints require that y
B
0d
   B0d = 1 and
yB0d    B0d  0; respectively. We take  B0d = 1 and 'B0d = 2: Now, agent As
box constraint holds with equality if we take A0d = 1 and '
A
0d
=  1. Therefore,
('A0d ; 
A
0d
;  A0d) = ( 1; 1; 0) and ('B0d ; B0d ;  B0d) = (2; 0; 1): At node 0u, there
are no securities nor repo trades. Thus, each agent consumes his endowments and
the portfolio positions remain, ('A0u ; 
A
0u
;  A0u) = (1; 0; 0) and ('
B
0u
; B0u ;  
B
0u
) =
(0; 0; 0):
At node 0du; agent Bs budget and box constraints require '
B
0du
+ hB0du =
0 and 'B0du + 
B
0du
 0, respectively. We make 'B0du = 1   a and B0du =
a. Thus, for agent A it must be that 'A0du = a and  
A
0du
= a: Therefore,
('A0du ; 
A
0du
;  A0du) = (a; 0; a) and ('
B
0du
; B0du ;  
B
0du
) = (1 a; a; 0): At node 0dd;
there are no security nor repo trades, and therefore ('A0dd ; 
A
0dd
;  A0dd) = ( 1; 1; 0)
and ('B0dd ; 
B
0dd
;  B0dd) = (2; 0; 1):
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At node 0duu ; portfolio positions are the same as in node 0du ; whereas at
0dud positions are the same as in node 0d . We have determined positions at
all types of nodes. See graphs 3 and 4 below.
(1,0,0,1)
(1,0,0,1)
(-1,1,0,0)
(-1,1,0,0)
(a,0,a,1)
(-1,1,0,0)
(a,0,a,1)
+
Graph 3: Agent As positions
('A; A;  A; 'A + A   h A):
(0,0,0,0)
(0,0,0,0)
(2,0,1,1)
(2,0,1,1)
(1-a,a,0,0)
(2,0,1,1)+
+
+ (1-a,a,0,0)
Graph 4: Agent Bs positions
('B; B;  B; 'B + B   h B):
It remains to show that the transversality condition (3.3) holds for both
agents. For A and B, these conditions are respectively
lim sup
T
X
:t()=T
i
 
'A + 
A
   h A
  0 (6.9)
and
lim sup
T
X
:t()=T
i
 
'B + h
A
    B
  0 (6.10)
We now notice that 'A + 
A
   h A and 'B + hA    B coincide with the term
'i + hz
i
 of condition (6.5) in Example 1. |
In the next section we discuss whether there are other non-arbitrage deators
for which the above security prices are free of bubbles.
Remark on uniform impatience: The well known result that bubbles in
positive net supply assets are absent under uniform impatience for deators with
nite present value of wealth (Santos and Woodford (Theorem 3.3)) extends to
securities that can only be shorted by borrowing them rst.
Denition 2: We say that the economy satises uniform impatience if there
exist  2 (0; 1) and  for each  2 D such that, for all x 2 RLD+ with x  
, we
have U i(~x(; 0)) > U i(x); 8i 2 I,  2 D, where ~x(; 0) = x for  2 DnD();
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~x(; 
0) = x +  and ~x(; 0) = 0x for  >  with 0 2 [; 1): Moreover,
9k > 0 : !i  k > 0; 8i 2 I;  2 D:
Let us show that in case I uniform impatience implies absence of price bubbles
for a security in positive net supply and a deator with nite present value of
wealth.
Denote by (p; q; r; x; y; z) an equilibrium and consider the following change in
consumption and nancial plans: xi 7! xi +; xi 7! xi for  > , ('i; zi) 7!
('i; z
i
) for   : Under uniform impatiance an appropiate choice of (; )
requires (1   )q('i + hzi) < p; so that optimality is not contradicted.
Notice that in case I (see proof of Proposition 3) we have 'i+hz
i
  0. It follows
that 0  (q=p)('i+hzi) < 1=(1 ): Adding across consumers we see that
q=p is uniformly bounded. If  is such that
P1
t=0
P
:t()=t p!
i
 <1; using
again Denition 2, we get limt!1
P
:t()=t q = 0 as claimed.
In case II we take the equilibrium plans of non-dealers and modify them
as above. Now, ('i; 
i
;  
i
) 7! ('i; i;  i);for   : Again, we require (1  
)q('
i
 + 
i
   h i) < p; where 'i + i   h i  0 by the box constraint.
So, it follows that (q=p!m )
P
i2ND('
i
 + 
i
   h i) < k 1(]ND)=(1   ); for
any m 2 ND:
Now, by (A3) we know that (q=
P
l pl)
P
i2D 
i
 is uniformly bounded and,
therefore, (q=
P
l p)
P
i2D '
i 
 is also uniformly bounded (by the box constraint).
It follows that (q=
P
l p)
P
i2D('
i
  i+hi) is uniformly bounded.17 Putting
the two results together we have that (q=p!m )(
P
i2I '
i
+
P
i2ND 
i
 
P
i2D  
i
 
h(
P
i2ND  
i
  
P
i2D 
i
)) is uniformly bounded (as
P
l pl=p!
m
  1= inf !m ):
Hence, (q=p!m ) 2 l1 and we get limt!1
P
:t()=t q = 0 as claimed for 
with
P1
t=0
P
:t()=t p!
m
 <1:
7 Specialness and bubbles
As seen in equation (15), the security price at a node  may exceed the series of
discounted dividends for two reasons. First, there may be positive shadow prices
of box constraints at this or future nodes. Second, the security may have a price
at innity. The former raises the fundamental value above what that discounted
17Since the uniform bounds from below and from above follow, respectively, from 'i   i 
 i and
P
i2D('
i
    i) =
P
i2ND('
i
   i) <
P
i2ND('
i+
   i) =
P
i2D('
i 
    i):
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dividends series is. The latter creates a bubble.
A positive shadow price of the box constraint at a node  implies that the
security is on special. This means that the respective repo rate is below the
general collateral rate, which is the prevailing repo market interest rate if the
borrower of funds can choose the bond to pledge. GC is generally below un-
collateralized borrowing, taken here, for simplicity, to be the interest rate () on
a risk free one-period bond. In fact, adding this bond to the model and adapting
the argument in Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2011) to case I, say, the Euler
conditions on repo positions of security j and on trade of that risk-free bond are,
respectively,
1 =
ij
i
j
qjhj
i

+ (1 + )
X
2+
i
i
(17)
1 = (1 + )
X
2+
i
i
(18)
Condition (18) holds in equality form as we are comparing with a risk free
bond that can be shorted and is itself not on special (see Du¢ e (1996), p. 494,
where such comparison is also done). Hence,  <  if and only if 
i
j > 0. So
specialness makes the security price to be above its series of discounted dividends.
Can the bubble occur on top or just instead of this overpricing? The next result
shows that it can but the occurrence of a bubble requires specialness to fade
away as time goes to innity.
Proposition 5: If security j has a bubble, at some node , then
lim
T!1
max
>:t()=T
(j   j) = 0:
The proof of Proposition 5 is in the Appendix.18
Remark to Examples 1 and 2: Are there other deators for which the
equilibrium security prices found in Examples 1 and 2 are free of bubbles?19
18Observe that limT!1
P
:t()=T 
i
j ! 0 does not, by itself, imply limT max
>:t()=T
(j  
j) = 0, as we just know that limT max
>:t()=T
1+
1+
 1  limT!1
max
>:t()=T
ij
h
¯ T
min
>:t()=T
iqj
, where
min
>:t()=T
iqj may tend to zero.
19We thank Manuel Santos for having risen this issue.
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Santos and Woodford (1997, Theorem 3.1) showed that when the supremum,
over all non-arbitrage deators, of the present value of wealth is nite, there
is always a deator for which bubbles are absent. Such non-arbitrage deators
were dened by requiring just the Euler condition on asset positions to hold with
equality. For the Kuhn-Tucker deator that we use in the examples, all Euler
conditions hold (namely, on consumption).
Our examples were based on an example (in Páscoa, Petrassi, Torres-Martínez
(2011)) of an economy with at money that ts in Santos and Woodford (1997)
set-up, but money has a positive price due to a bubble. Clearly, such equilibrium
price cannot be obtained free of bubbles for another deator with non-arbitrage
conditions holding with equality (as the price would be zero, since money has
no dividends). Hence, by Theorem 3.1 in Santos and Woodford (1997), the
supremum over all such deators of the present value of wealth had to be innite
in that monetary example. Nevertheless, the positive price of money can be
shown to be recovered free of bubbles for a deator with non-arbitrage conditions
holding with strict inequality at nodes where the portfolio constraint (a no-short-
sales restriction on money) was binding.
Similarly, in the examples in this paper, we can nd a non-arbitrage dea-
tor for which the equilibrium security price is free of bubbles, but this deator
makes non-arbitrage conditions hold with strict inequality at nodes where the
box constraint is binding. In this way, we keep the same security prices, but the
bubble is replaced by an extra term in the fundamental value consisting of the
series of box shadow prices.
Let us be more precise and start by dening a non-arbitrage deator.
Denition 3: In case I, we say that for prices (q; r) there are linearized
arbitrage opportunities at node  if 9 ('; z) : ' +z  0 and A('; z) > 0;
where  = H if z > 0,  = 1 if z < 0 and  2 [H; 1]; and
A =
"
 q  qh
(q + pB)2+ (hrq)2+
#
Lemma 2: In case I, there exist no arbitrage opportunities if and only if
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9 0;   0 such that
q =
X
2+
(q + pB) + 
qh =
X
2+
rhq + 
This is proven by the theorem of separation of convex cones (see Araujo,
Fajardo and Páscoa (2002, Theorem 1).
Let us call (; ) a pair of non-arbitrage deator and shadow values.
Proposition 6: In Example 1, the same security prices q are obtained if the
Kuhn-Tucker deator  is replaced by the non-arbitrage deator i =

t()=pt()
P
 
i

together with the shadow values process  = i
t=pt; where i = 
i
2
 t() if the
box constraint is binding at node  and zi > 0; and 
i
 = 0 otherwise.
Denition 4: In case II, we say that for prices (q; r) there are arbitrage
opportunities
- for a dealer at node  if 9 ('; ;  ) :   0;    0; ' +       0
and Ad('; ;  ) > 0; where
Ad =
"
 q  hq  q
(q + pB)2+ (hr1q)2+ (r2q)2+
#
- for a non-dealer at node  if 9 ('; ;  ) :   0;    0; '+     0
and And('; ;  ) > 0; where
And =
"
 q  q  hq
(q + pB)2+ (r1q)2+ (hr2q)2+
#
Lemma 3: In case II, there exist no arbitrage opportunities if and only if
9 0;   0 such that, if the agent is a dealer, we have
q =
X
2+
(q + pB) +  (19)
qh 
X
2+
r1hq +  (20)
q 
X
2+
r2q +  (21)
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If the agent is a non-dealer instead, we replace  by h in (20) and  by
=h in (21).
An analogous proposition to Proposition 6 for case II holds with i = 
i
2
 t()
if the box constraint is binding at node  and zi > 0; and 
i
 = 0 otherwise.
Finally, notice that the supremum of the present value of aggregate endow-
ments, over all deators for which non-arbitrage conditions hold with equality,
is still innite as in the example in Páscoa, Petrassi and Torres-Martínez (2011).
In fact, the way that supremum is computed (indicated by Proposition 2.2 in
Santos and Woodford (1997)) in that example shows that the supremum for the
economy with at money is the same as the supremum in the economy with repo
markets. This suggests that when we look for a deator for which there is no
bubble, we should nd it within the class where non-arbitrage conditions may
hold with strict inequalities at some nodes.
8 Concluding remarks
Once we explicitly take into account the way securities are actually shorted,
by borrowing them rst in repo markets, we see that mechanisms that bound
leverage and ensure equilibrium in nite horizon will also prevent innite lived
agents from doing Ponzi schemes. This result dispenses any uniform impatience
assumptions. In this security and repo context, we see reappearing the main
insight in Santos and Woodford (1996): bubbles in positive net supply securities
(for deators with nite present value of wealth) cannot occur when markets are
complete but may occur in incomplete markets when consumers are not uniformly
impatient. However, that room for bubbles seemed to be quite narrow before,
as, in the absence of uniform impatience, short sales apparently had to be ruled
out (as in the examples by Santos and Woodford (1996) or Páscoa, Petrassi and
Torres-Martínez (2011)).
Now, if shorting and security borrowing are properly coupled, Ponzi schemes
are not always ruled out (as our example shows) but are absent when there is
limited leverage. So, bubbles may occur in incomplete markets, when uniform
impatience fails but leverage is adequately bounded. We presented two ways
that limit the re-hypothecation of the security and the resulting leverage. One
is the increasing practise (after Lehmans banruptcy) of not re-using (shorting
or lending) the haircut collected when borrowing a security. The other is the
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current arrangement that limits, by regulation, the positions of dealers, whom by
collecting but not posting haircut would have an incentive to borrow and lend,
at the same time, large amounts of securities. Such non-convexity in dealers
attitudes contrasts with their counterpartiespreference for convex combinations,
as haircut is posted but not collected. Counterparties (hedge funds, mutual
funds, retail securities brokers, private banks and insurance companies) do not
need to have positions bounded.
There are many issues that would deserve further work. As usual in the
literature, the assetspositive net supply results from initial holdings at the rst
date. Issuance at other nodes of the event-tree is not being considered. An
interesting step would be to model issuance and discuss its implications (both
in the equity and the debt forms). Clearly, the issuance chosen should not be
bounded by simple quantitative constraints (of the type that bounded borrowing
in the previous literature) but one should take into account that a large issuance
may decrease the security price (raise the interest paid on debt). Price taking
might be questionable in that context. Repo fails or the counterpartiesdefault
in repurchasing securities were also not addressed, but there may be interesting
substitution e¤ects between not honoring repo agreements and running a Ponzi
scheme. Finally, more applied work could try to look at the relative importance
of bubbles and specialness as two forms of overpricing securities, both shown by
us to occur only in incomplete markets.
9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: For each agent i and for each T 2 N, we dene , an
optimization problem with nite horizon T by truncating the utility functions in
the following way U iT (x) =
P
2DT (0) u
i
(x) and modifying the budget and box
constraints at  with t()  T  1 in the following way. For t > T no commodity,
security or repo trades can be done. At t = T commodities can be traded,
securities pay dividends but are no longer traded. At T   1 repo trades cannot
be done (since at the following date securities have no value) and securities are
traded under a plain no-short-sales restriction.
That is, for  with t() = T   1 we require giT (a; a  ; p; q; r)  p(x   !i)+
q('   ' )  pB'    q rh z   0 together with f iT (a; a )  '  0.
For  such that t() = T we require giT (a; a  ; p; q; r)  p(x   !i)   q'   
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pB'   0.
The truncated Lagrangean is dened at each node  by
LiT (a; a  ;; ; p; q; r)  ui(x)  giT (a; a  ; p; q; r) + f iT (a)
Now, the saddle point property holds for some multipliers (iT ; 
iT
j )j at a so-
lution aiT to this truncated problem20, that is, for any plan (a)2DT (0) satisfying
relevant sign constraints we haveX
:t()T
LiT (a; a  ;
iT
 ; 
iT
 ; p; q; r)  U iT
 
xiT

(22)
iT g
iT
 (a; a  ; p; q; r) = 0; 
iT
 f
iT
 (a) = 0: (23)
Notice that U iT
 
xiT
  U i(xi) (as the truncated problem has additional
constraints), so X
:t()T
LiT (a; a  ;
iT
 ; 
iT
 ; p; q; r)  U i(xi) (24)
(i) To derive Euler conditions, as iT f
iT
 ('
i
; z
i
) = 0; we can work with the
following inequalityX
:t()T
LiT (a; a  ;
iT
 ; 
iT
 ; p; q; r)  U i(xi) +
X
:t()T
iT f
iT
 ('
i
; z
i
) (25)
The next claim is almost the desired Euler conditions as it says that iT D1giT +P
2+ 
iT
 D2giT is getting closer, as T ! 1; to being a super-gradient of ui +
f
iT
 (with u
i
 restricted to the positive orthant).
Claim 1: For each  with t()  T   1 and for any action for that node
b = (~x; ~'; ~z) with ~x  0 we have
ui(~x)  ui(xi) + (f iT (~'; ~z)  f iT ('i; zi))  (iT D1giT (ai; ai  ; p; q; r)+X
2+
iT D2giT (ai; ai  ; p; q; r))(b  ai) +
X
2DnDT
ui(x
i
) (26)
20This follows by the generalized Slater constraint qualication (Uzawa (1958)): by making
x0 = !
i
0
; ' = e
i
 and for  6= 0, x = !i + Bei, so that budget constraints hold with
equality and box constraints with strict inequality.
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Proof of Claim 1: This follows by using (25) making, for any node ;
a = a
i
(1   1()) + b1() where 1() = 1 if  =  and equal to 0 otherwise,
for  with t()  T   1: 
Now, we let T !1. The sequence (iT ; (iTj )j)T is bounded for each node 
by Lemma 4 below. So, we can nd a cluster point (i; (
i
j)j) for the countable
product topology. Denote by  the indicator function of RL+ dened by (c) = 0
for c 2 RL+ and (c) =  1 otherwise. Let ui(:) + (:)  u^i(:). Taking the
limit in (26) we get that iD1gi(ai; ai  ; p; q; r) +
P
2+ 
i
D2gi(ai; ai  ; p; q; r)
is a supergradient v0 at point a
i
 of the function v : (~x; ~'; ~z) 7! u^i(~xi) +
f
i
(~'; ~z), which embodies the restriction of u
i
 to the positive orthant :
Now, k is a super-gradient of  at c i¤ k(c0   c)  0 for any c0  0. So kc = 0
(by picking c0 = 0 and c0 = 2c): Applying Theorem 23.8 in Rockafellar (1970) we
write v0 as a sum of a supergradient of the unrestricted function u
i
(:) + f
i
(:)
and a supergradient k of . We get (10) from the non-negativity of k and (11)
from kai = 0.
Observe that the equality in (10) actually holds for the coordinates of variables
not subject to sign constraints.
(ii) Let us now prove that the transversality condition (12) holds. We use
the inequality (24) and make a = ai if t()  t   1 and a = 0 otherwise.
Notice that gi(0; a  ; p; q; r) =  p!i+D2gi(p; q; r) ai , for  with t() = t; and
gi(0; 0; p; q; r) =  p!i, for  with t()  t+ 1, as ui(; 0) = 0: Then, we obtain
 
X
:t()=t
iT  D2gi(p; q; r)  ai  +
X
:Tt()>t
iT p!
i
 
X
:t()t
ui(x
i
)
Now, by (A1)(ii) the series of utilities converges for feasible plans (that is,P
:t()t u
i
(x
i
) ! 0 as t ! 1). Then, using Li2(a; a ) =  i  D2gi(p; q; r) ,
we obtain (12). 
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider any plan ai satisfying the budget, box
and sign constraints. Let xi its respective consumption plan. Denote by U iT the
truncation of U i to the nite horizon T . Now, we know that
U iT (x)  U iT (xi) 
X
:t()T
(Li(a
i)  Li(ai)): (27)
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Notice that by the superdi¤erential property,X
:t()T
(Li(a
i)  Li(ai)) 
X
:t()T
(Li1(a
i); Li2(a
i))((ai; a
i
 )  (ai; ai )) =
=
X
:t()<T
(Li1(a
i) +
X
2+
Li2(a
i))ai +
X
:t()=T
Li1(a
i)ai 
 
X
:t()<T
(Li1(a
i) +
X
2+
Li2(a
i))ai  
X
:t()=T
Li1(a
i)ai
Taking T !1 and using Euler and transversality conditions (10), (11) and (12),
we get
lim sup
T!1
X
:t()T
(Li(a)  Li(ai))  lim sup
T!1
X
:t()=T
Li1(a
i)a (28)
and, therefore,
lim sup
T!1
(U iT (x)  U iT (xi))  lim sup
T!1
X
:t()=T
Li1(a
i)a (29)

Proof of Lemma 1: We take inequality (24) and make a = (0; 0; 0) for
every node . Then, X
:t()T
ip!
i
 + 
i
0
q0e
i  U i(xi)
Making T !1 we see that P:t()T ip!i converges. 
Proof of Proposition 3: The Euler condition on x  0 (which holds at
this cluster point of nite horizon equilibria) is
@Li
@x
= Dxui(; xi) ip  0 for
all  2 D: Therefore, (13) can be rewritten as shown next.
In case I: Let Ai   iq('+hz)+i('+Hz+  z  ): Then (13) reduces
to requiring
lim sup
T!1
X
:t()=T
Ai  0
to hold for any ('; z) satisfying budget and box constraints. Notice that ' +
Hz
+
  z   0 implies '+hz  0; as H  h < 1: So, if i = 0; then Ai  0;
8 2 D: But if i > 0; then Ai = ( iq + i)' + ( iqh + i)z; 8 2 D;
where  = H if z > 0 and 1 otherwise.
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Now, Ai  ( iq + i)('j + Hz+j   z j), since  iqhz + iz =
 iqh(z+   z  ) + i(Hz+   z  )   iq(Hz+   z  ) + i(Hz+   z  ): The
Euler condition on ' implies that  iq + i =  
P
2+ 
i
(pB + q) < 0.
Hence Ai  0.
In case II: For any ('; ;  ) satisfying budget and box constraints, with
(;  )  0, and jqj'ijj  Mj if i 2 D; the analogous dealers the condition is
lim supT!1
P
:t()=T Bi  0; where Bi   iq('+h  )+ i('+  );
and the corresponding non-dealers condition is lim supT!1
P
:t()=T Ci  0;
where Ci   iq(' +    h )+ i(' +     ):
Let us start with the non-dealers condition. We have Ci  ( iq+i)('j+
   ) since (iqh   i)   (iq   i) : Now,  iq + i < 0 (again this
follows from the Euler condition in '); so Ci  0 and the desired condition
holds.
Let us now look at the dealerscondition. Notice that  i +
ij
qj
  ihj +
ij
qj
  P2+ ir1jhj (from dealers Euler condition in j). Then, Bi P
j( i+
ij
qj
)qj('j  j) 
P
j(
i
 
ij
qj
)qjj. Now, for the dealers, the real
value of long repo positions is uniformly bounded, that is, qjj=
P
l pl is uni-
formly bounded. As ihj  
ij
qj
 0, it su¢ ces to show thatP:t()=t Pl pl 2
l1. We know that
P
2D p!
i
 <1. Since !i o 0, we have
P
:t()=t 
i

P
l pl 2
l1, as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 1: An equilibrium for a nite horizon T economy is
dened by requiring market clearing and individual optimality subject to these
modied constraints. We denote it by (pT ; qT ; rT ; aT ) and (iT ; 
iT
 ) be an asso-
ciated vector of Lagrange multipliers of budget and box constraints (respectively)
of agent i. Notice that pT  0 (by monotonicity), we can normalize (pT ; qT ) in
the simplex.
Lemma T1: For each node  we have iT
P
l p
T
l  U i(
)=!i, where !i =
minl !
i
l.
Proof : By the saddle point property, for any (a)2DT (0) satisfying relevant
sign constraints, we haveX
:t()T
Li(a; a  ;
iT
 ; 
iT
 ; p
T ; qT ; rT )  U iT (xiT ) (30)
iT g
iT
 (a; a  ; p
T ; qT ; rT ) = 0; iT f
iT
 (a) = 0: (31)
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Now let a be the plan consisting of consumption !i, null security position
and null repo positions for nodes  such that t()  t   1 while being zero at
other nodes. Then the above saddle point inequality implies
P
:t()=t 
iT
 p
T
 !
i
 
U iT (xiT )  U i(
) and we get the result. 
Lemma T2:
P
l p
T
l0
is bounded away from zero.
Proof: We consider the following plan for case I: (~xT ; ~'T ; ~zT ) = ((1 pTl0)xiT+
bEl0 ; (1  pTl0)'iT ; (1  pTl0)ziT ); where El0 is the canonical vector in the direc-
tion of commodity l at node 0: This plan satises the date 0 budget constraint
as long as pTl0b  pTl0(pT0xiT0 + qT0('iT0 + h0ziT0 ) = pT0!i0 + qT0ei: Observe that it
is enough to make b  minl;jf!il0 ; eijg; as (pT0 ; qT0) belongs to the simplex. Sub-
sequent budgent constraints are clearly satised too. This plan clearly satises
box constraints. Now, if pTl0 ! 0 then (1  pTl0)xiT would converge to xiT in the
l1 norm topology, for which the utility is continuous. Thus, U iT (~xT ) > U iT (xiT )
for T large enough, a contradiction. The proof for case II is analogous. 
Lemma T3: For each node  we have the sequence (iT )T bounded.
Proof: Lemmas T1 and T2 imply that (iT0 )T is bounded. To see what hap-
pens at the immediately following nodes, we recall that the rst order condition
on 'j for the truncated economy is
iT q
T
j =
X
2+
iT (q
T
j + p
T
Bj) + 
iT
j
Take  = 0 and suppose that 
iT
 !1 for some  2 +0 . Then, qTj should go
to 0 for every j: But, as (pT ; q
T
 ) is in the simplex, is would follow that
P
l p
T
l ! 1:
Then, by Lemma T1, iT 9 1; a contradiction. We have shown that (iT )T
bounded for every  such that t() = t(0)+1: The proof for the following nodes
proceeds in the same way using the above rst order condition. 
Lemma T4: For each node  we have the sequence (iTj )T bounded.
Proof: Recall that in case I the rst order condition on zj for the truncated
economy is
iT q
T
jhj =
X
2+
iT q
T
jhjrj + 
iT
jj
where j = Hj if z
iT
j > 0 and j = 1 otherwise. So, 
iT
j  iT qTjhj=Hj and
the result follows by Lemma T3.
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In case II the rst order condition on j for the truncated economy requires
iT q
T
jhj 
X
2+
iT q
T
jhjr1j + 
iT
j if i 2 D
iT q
T
j 
X
2+
iT q
T
jr2j + 
iT
j if i 2 ND
For both types of agents, we have iTj  iT qTj; and Lemma T3 applies again. 
We already know that as (pT ; q
T
 ) is in the simplex, the sequence (p
T
 ; q
T
 )T
is bounded, node by node. For the price variable rT that was left outside the
simplex, we say the following:
Lemma T5: The sequence (rT )T is bounded for each :
Proof: We show that RT  1=rT is bounded away from 0. In case I, the rst
order condition on zj implies that
RTj 
X
2+
iT
iT
So, if (for a subsequence) RTj ! 0, then iT =iT ! 0; for any  2 +: Now, by
(A1) we have that
iT
iT
=
Dlui(xiT )pl
Dlui(xiT )pl
. As
Dlui(xiT )
Dlui(xiT )
is bounded away from zero,
it follows that pl
pl
! 0; so pl ! 0 (as pl is bounded). This is impossible for
 = 0; by Lemma T2.
For  6= 0 the following argument applies. Since
Dlui0 (x
iT
0
)
Dlui(xiT )
=
iT0
pl0
iT pl
; where
the left hand side is bounded (by A1), if pl ! 0, then 
iT
0
iT
! 0: Now, iT is
bounded, so iT0 ! 0; implying Dlui0(xiT0 ) ! 0: However, lim infT Dlui0(xiT0 ) 2
Dlui0([0;
0 ]); which by (A1) cannot contain 0:
The proof for case II is analogous, using the rst order condition on j: 
Hence, the above Lemmas allow us to nd for (pT ; qT ; rT ; aT ; (iT ; 
iT
 )i;) a
cluster point (p; q; r; a; (i; 
i
)i;), as T ! 1 (for the countable product topol-
ogy). We claim that (p; q; r; a) is an equilibrium.
Notice that Euler conditions hold at (p; q; r; a; (i; 
i
)i;); by taking limits on
rst order conditions of nite horizon economies. Then, by Propositions 1, 2 and
3 it su¢ ces to show that the transversality condition is satised. This follows as
in item (ii) of the proof of Proposition 1 since the following inequality holds for
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any T :
 
X
:t()=t
iT  D2gi(pT ; qT ; rT )  ai  +
X
:Tt()>t
iT p
T
 !
i
 
X
:t()t
ui(x
i
)
and we make T ! 1 noticing that Li2(a; a ) =  i  D2gi(p; q; r) . This
cocludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 4: For the sequence of horizon T truncated optimization problems
with a common price vector (p; q; r) the corresponding sequence of multipliers
(iT ; (
iT
j )j)T is bounded for each node :
Proof: This follows by adapting Lemmas T1 and T4 replacing (pT ; qT ; rT )
by (p; q; r): 
Proof of Proposition 5: From equations (7.1) and (7.2) we have that
X
>:t()=T
qjhj
i


1  1 + 
1 + 


X
>:t()=T
ij
and, therefore, letting h
¯ T
= min
>:t()=T
hj we have
h
¯ T
(1  max
>:t()=T
1 + 
1 + 
)
X
>:t()=T
qj
i
 
X
>:t()=T
ij
Now, if the right hand side tends to zero, as T !1, we have the claimed re-
sult, as
P
>:t()=T qj
i
 9 0 implies max
>:t()=T
1+
1+
! 1: To see thatP>:t()=T ij !
0, we use inequality (24) and make a = (0; ei; 0) for every node . Then,X
:t()T
ip(!
i
 +Be
i) + ei
X
:t()T
ij  U i(xi)
Making T !1 we see that P:t()T ij converges:
Proof of Proposition 6: It is easy to see that the Euler equation in ' is
satised. Then, the Euler equation in z is satised if the repo rate would be
decreased by
" =
i
 
pt()+1Bt()+1 + 1
P
> 
i



h
  1

But, in all events we get " = 0 as can be seen by the way  and 
i
 were
dened.
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